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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
and
Lynn Scott Magruder**

This Article surveys noteworthy cases that Georgia appellate courts,
the United States District Courts in Georgia, and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decided during the survey period as they relate to Georgia corporate, partnership, securities, and banking law. It also reviews important acts of the Georgia General Assembly concerning the areas of corporations, partnerships, securities, and banking law.
I.

A.

CORPORATIONS

Piercing the Corporate Veil

During the survey period, many of the cases decided by the Georgia
Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals relating to corporations
reviewed the allegations of appellants concerning the familiar corporate
law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. The courts have failed to define precise standards for these cases and this failure has resulted in
rather unpredictable holdings. A tremendous amount of uncertainty exists in legal and business communities concerning the outcome in any
particular fact situation. Predictably, a fair number of parties unsuccessful at the trial level appeal in order to try their luck in the appellate
courts. The authors believe that much of the problem is due to the appellate courts' failure to provide the bench, bar, and business communities
with a seminal case that defines clearly the piercing theory and standards
* Partner in the firm of Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University (B.A., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, Mercer Law Review (1980-1982);
Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1971); Mercer University (J.D. magna cum laude, 1988). Member, Mercer
Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor (1987-1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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in a way that could be useful in later cases to predict the outcome of fact
patterns that suggest a piercing remedy.
In 1990 the court of appeals gave us Hyzer v. Hickman,1 a piercing of
the corporate veil case that shocked many reviewers because it held that
undercapitalization of a corporation plus any other factor that suggested
abuse of the corporate form would yield a potential claim for piercing the
corporate veil in Georgia.' The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari in Hyzer and overturned the court of appeals 1990 decision.3 In reviewing the court of appeals decision, the supreme court had an opportunity to enunciate a more definitive standard for piercing the corporate
veil. Unfortunately, this enunciation was not forthcoming, and the supreme court overruled the court of appeals in a two-page decision.*
The supreme court reviewed the facts and concluded that it could find
no evidence that the shareholders at the time of the formation of the
corporation intended to undercapitalize the corporation to avoid future
debts.5 The court additionally discussed how small or "close" corporations are often capitalized with a combination of small equity and large
shareholder loans in order to get tax advantages for the investors and
that, in and of itself, this arrangement is not illegal. Finally, the court
reviewed the discussion of "preferential distributions" alleged by plaintiffs at the trial level and concluded that it could find no evidence of such
preferential distribution or fraudulent intent on the part of Hickman.'
The court found only a case involving a failed business and not wrongdoing, fraud, or bad faith.'
The court of appeals decision in Hickman v. Hyzerl concerned many
Georgia attorneys because it signaled an expansion of a plaintiff's ability
to prevail in a piercing case with a rather benign fact situation. Although
the Supreme Court of Georgia came to the proper conclusion by applying
the traditional legal standards in this area, it is disappointing that the
supreme court failed to give a detailed explanation of the standards of
piercing or provide helpful dicta to prevent other Hickman type cases
from being tried in the future.
It can not be overstated how important it is for the commerce of the
State of Georgia to insure its corporate investors that their limited liabil1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

195 Ga. App. 213, 393 S.E.2d 79 (1990), reu'd, 261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
195 Ga. App. at 217, 393 S.E.2d at 82.
261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
Id. at 38, 401 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 40, 401 S.E.2d at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41, 401 S.E.2d at 740.
195 Ga. App. 213, 393 S.E.2d 79 (1990).
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ity status as shareholders is secure. Piercing the corporate veil is a helpful, equitable theory necessary to right cer.tain wrongs, but it must be
used only in appropriate and carefully defined situations. As the remaining survey cases reveal, the lack of predictability in this area encourages
plaintiffs and their counsel to plead a piercing theory even when the facts
would not warrant such protection by the courts.
The court of appeals rendered an interesting opinion in Southern Environmental Group, Inc. v. Rosebud Landscape Gardeners,Inc.10 In an affirmance of the trial court's opinion, the court of appeals held that evidence of the maintenance of the corporate fiction could be found when
one corporation purchased assets and assumed debts of another corporation that then ceased doing business, and the two corporations did not
become one and the same for purposes of a garnishment debt owed by the
first corporation." Rosebud Landscape Gardeners, Inc. was formed in
1985, but due to business reversals the company sold the majority of its
assets to T.W. Flowers, Inc. in late 1988. The two companies had one
shareholder and director in common, operated out of the same location,
used the same equipment, and operated under the same trade name
"Rosebud Landscape Gardeners.""
Southern Environmental Group, Inc. sued the Adamses in a garnishment action and named as a defendant in the garnishment action "Rose'3
bud Landscape Gardeners, Inc., a/k/a and d/b/a T.W. Flowers, Inc.'
The Adamses had a large contract with T.W. Flowers, Inc. ("Flowers")
and the garnishment sought, to reach a payment pursuant to the contract
made by the Adamses to the Flowers. Rosebud Landscape Gardeners, Inc.
("Rosebud") responded to the garnishment by filing a traverse. Rosebud
alleged that the garnishment affidavit was untrue because it ceased doing
business as a corporation in December, 1988. Flowers responded by filing
a claim to the money based on its 1989 contract with the Adamses. 1
The court determined that the only issue for decision was "whether the
evidence demanded a finding that Flowers, Inc. was the alter ego of Rosebud, Inc. [such] that the corporate structures of the two companies
should be disregarded."' 5 The court believed that the case was unique
because it concerned two corporations sought to be held alter egos of each
other so that the latter corporation would be held responsible for a judg10. 196 Ga. App. 392, 395 S.E.2d 913 (1990).
11. Id. at 395, 395 S.E.2d at 915.
12. Id. at 392, 395 S.E.2d at 914.

13. Id. at 393, 395 S.E.2d at 914.
14. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 914-15.
15. Id. at 394, 395 S.E.2d at 915.
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ment against the former.1 ' Normally, piercing or alter ego contests try to
show that a shareholderis the alter ego of a corporation.
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had not been persuaded that a preponderance of the evidence showed the two separate
corporations to be "melded. ' 17 Because evidence showed the maintenance
of the corporate fiction and because the court could not properly reweigh
such evidence on appeal, it upheld the trial court's decision.' s
The result in this case may have been different if plaintiff had pled and
argued its case under theories of successor liability of a corporation or de
facto merger instead of an "alter ego," piercing theory. Under the 1985
Georgia Supreme Court case of Bullington v. Union Tool Corp.19 and
other relevant Georgia cases, there may have been an opportunity for the
plaintiff to demonstrate that Flowers was a successor and had liability for
obligations created by Rosebud.2
To the extent that the principles concerning piercing the corporate veil
can be gleaned from Georgia appellate cases, the courts generally require
a showing of disregard for the corporate entity and a conclusion that not
piercing would allow an entity to perpetrate a fraud, defeat justice, or
evade contractual or tort responsibility. In Commonwealth Financial
Corp. v. Sherrill," the court of appeals was asked to overrule the trial
court when an assignee of an accounts receivable from a corporation
sought to pierce the corporate veil and reach the assets of the shareholder
of the corporation in order to satisfy the corporation's accounts receivable
obligation.2 2 The shareholder had made no personal guarantee or other
legal obligation to pay the assignor of the accounts receivable in the event
the corporation failed to pay. The court of appeals found this fact fatal to
the assignee's ability to pursue the shareholder of the corporation.2 The
court held that the assignee had no greater rights2against the shareholder
than did the assignor of the accounts receivable. '
The assignee, Commonwealth Financial, Inc. ("Commonwealth"), pled
piercing of the corporate veil in order to reach the assets of Sherrill, the
shareholder of the corporation that owed the money to the assignee. Commonwealth presented evidence demonstrating that Sherrill's operation of
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 254 Ga. 283, 328 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
20. See Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott Magruder, Business Associations, 42 MERcER L.
Rzv. 71, 80-83 (1990) for a discussion of Bullington and other recent Georgia appellate cases
related to successor liability and de facto merger.
21. 197 Ga. App. 403, 398 S.E.2d 438 (1990).
22. Id. at 403, 398 S.E.2d at 438.
23. Id. at 404, 398 S.E.2d at 439.
24. Id.
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the corporation amounted to, in the court's view, "far less than a model of
proper corporate procedures and in many instances did not comply with
legal requirements for operating in a corporate capacity."'2 5 However, the
court would not consider the piercing argument, in large part because it
did not believe that an injustice needed to be corrected. Without detailed
explanation, the court indicated that disregarding the corporate form and
failing to maintain corporate procedures are not enough to pierce the corporate veil unless there is an injustice, fraud, or evasion of contractual or
tort responsibility that must be addressed.2 0 The court decided that failure of a corporation to pay a financial obligation, without evidence of
fraud, injustice, or evasion of contractual and tort responsibilities, would
not allow a plaintiff to invoke the protection of the court by piercing the
27
corporate veil.

In Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc.,36 the court of appeals upheld the trial court
in a complex factual situation, which dealt with products liability, other
tort matters, and included an appeal from a directed verdict in favor of a
defendant-shareholder on a piercing of the corporate veil theory." At
trial, the jury found defendant-corporation liable for over one million dollars in compensatory damages, but also returned a verdict against the
shareholder, Eckes. The trial court overruled the verdict against Eckes
because it had reserved its right to rule on defendant's motion for directed verdict prior to submitting this portion of the case to the jury. 0
The court of appeals found that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient
evidence to allow the jury to pierce the corporate veil and hold Eckes
personally liable for the liabilities of the corporation he had owned.31 The
court also found no evidence of disregard of the corporate entity or of
fraud, injustice, or evasion of contractual or tort responsibility. 2 The
court concluded that it would not deny the legality of the corporate existence for the purpose of holding the shareholder liable in the absence of
such fraud, injustice, or evasion of responsibility. 8
In Hester Enterprises,Inc. v. Narvais,84 the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's holding that Hester, the president of Hester Enterprises,
was liable for negligent construction of a house that his company built for
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.

199 Ga. App. 303, 404 S.E.2d 607 (1991).

29. Id. at 305-07, 404 S.E.2d at 610-11.
30. Id. at 304, 404 S.E.2d at 609.

31. Id. at 306, 404 S.E.2d at 610.
32. Id. at 306-07, 404 S.E.2d at 610.11.
33. Id. at 307, at 404 S.E.2d at 611.
34. 198 Ga. App. 580, 402 S.E.2d 333 (1991).
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plaintiff.as The evidence at trial showed that at the closing Hester guaranteed performance of a new agreement pursuant to which Hester Enterprises would install a central air conditioning system in plaintiff's home.'
The court of appeals felt that such an assurance by Hester did not imply
a personal guarantee, but merely affirmed a guarantee
of the corporation
37
agreement.
new
this
under
performance
for its
The court considered whether or not any evidence in the record indicated that Hester also conducted his private and corporate business on an
interchangeable or joint basis, such that the corporation as a separate entity should be disregarded and Hester held liable for the obligations of
the corporation. 8 The court of appeals reviewed the facts and found no
evidence that Hester commingled funds or confused the corporation's
records, assets, or finances with his own, 89 or of improper payments or
undercapitalization.' The court concluded that the judgment against
Hester should be reversed and that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for directed verdict.'
In Jones v. Shafer,' the court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding that Bobby L. Jones, the principal officer and stockholder of corporate-defendant, Cherokee Homes, Inc. ("Cherokee"), was personally liable
to Mr. and Mrs. Shafer for the waterproofing bill arising from repair of a
defective basement in a house built by Cherokee for the Shafers." Cherokee entered into a contract to build the Shafers' home, and Jones was not
a party to the sales contract. The trial court found that Jones assured the
Shafers that they would have a dry basement." The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, which characterized Jones' statement as a
personal guarantee of a dry basement, made not as the assurance of a
corporate officer. 4 8 The characterization of Jones' statements as a personal guarantee allowed the court of appeals to avoid considering the issues of limited liability and piercing.
35.

Id. at 582, 402 S.E.2d at 336.

36. Id. at 581, 402 S.E.2d at 335.
37. Id.
38. Id., 402 S.E.2d at 334. The characterization of the issue will become relevant when
we contrast this case to Jones v. Shafer, 196 Ga. App. 254, 395 S.E.2d 662 (1990), following a
discussion of Hester.
39. 198 Ga. App. at 581, 402 S.E.2d at 335.
40. Id. at 582, 402 S.E.2d at 335. It is apparent that the court of appeals is trying to
qualify its reasoning and review of the facts with analogies to the issues it thought were
relevant in order to be consistent with its finding in Hyzer v. Hickman, 195 Ga. App. 213,
393 S.E.2d 79 (1990), which was later reversed. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
41. 198 Ga. App. at 582, 402 S.E.2d at 336.
42, 196 Ga. App. 254, 395 S.E.2d 662 (1990).
43. Id. at 254, 395 S.E.2d at 663.
44. Id.
45.

Id.
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The facts in Jones and in Hester are startlingly similar. In Hester the
court focused on the piercing issue, but in Jones they focused on the fact
that an officer who "personally guarantees" an obligation may be personally liable for the performance of that particular obligation. Hester was
decided seven months after Jones, but the court in Hester fails to cite
Jones in its decision. However, the court in Hester indicated an appreciation of the Jones rationale when it stated that "[m]oreover, a corporate
officer who does personally guarantee an obligation may be personally liable for the performance of that particular obligation, but such a personal
guarantee does not render him personally liable on any and all corporate
obligations. '
This language suggests an interesting option to plaintiff's attorneys in
piercing cases. In an appropriate factual setting, in addition to including
a classic piercing pleading, the attorney should also include in the complaint pleading that an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporation
made a "personal guarantee of an obligation," which should be considered
separately from the piercing analysis. When an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporation makes oral statements about the subject of the
corporation's business, does he speak as a representative of the corporation or in his separate capacity as an individual? The result could be a
Jones analysis finding that an officer making a statement which he or she
intended to be on behalf of the corporation could be construed' by the
trier of fact to be a personal obligation of the officer. By alleging that a
separate contract arose orally between an officer, director, or shareholder
of a corporation and a party with which the corporation has contracted,
even about matters that were part of the corporation's contract, a piercing analysis would be avoided. This may be a Pandora's box.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Fidelity
Capital Corp.4 7 reviewed the Georgia law concerning piercing the' corporate veil and vacated and remanded the decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia that allowed piercing.' s This case name may seem familiar because this article reviewed its
predecessor last year."9 In the prior case the Eleventh Circuit remanded
the case to the district court for determination of whether Fidelity Capital Corp. could be considered the alter ego of Skiba, its President, and the
sole shareholder of its parent company, and to certify its holdings to the
Eleventh Circuit.5
46.
47.
48.
49.
50-60.
50.

198 Ga. App. 580, 581, 402 S.E.2d 333, 335 (1991).
920 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. 'at 840.
See Quir6s & Magruder, supra note 20, at 71; see also infra text accompanying notes
United States v. Fidelity Capital Corp., 88 F.2d 1344, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 1989).
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The facts in this case are a little convoluted, but simplified, Skiba
owned two companies, Fidelity Capital Corp. ("Fidelity") and Peachtree/
Cantrell, Inc. ("Peachtree"). Peachtree owned a tract of land and a
townhouse development subject to several mortgages, which included a
mortgage to Fidelity. Peachtree received a first mortgage loan from Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. ("Commonwealth") for $3,600,000 in order to
develop the townhouse properties, but the attorney handling the closing
failed to obtain a satisfaction of Fidelity's prior mortgage on the Peachtree property. As a result, Commonwealth had a second mortgage and
needed to satisfy Fidelity in order to foreclose on the mortgage when
Peachtree defaulted on the loan. Because Skiba owned Peachtree and Fidelity, plaintiff argued that both of these corporations were alter egos of
Skiba and, therefore, allowing Skiba to retain Fidelity's first mortgage position in addition to the benefit of the Commonwealth loan would be
inequitable. 1
In its November 1987 order, the district court found that Skiba was the
alter ego of Fidelity.S On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit decided that the
district court could not conclude from Skiba's mere ownership and control of Fidelity that Fidelity became his alter ego without more evidence
that Skiba abused the corporate form in some way.5 3 Accordingly, the
court remanded and directed the district court to make findings of fact on
the abuse of the corporate form issue.5'
The thrust of the Eleventh Circuit's rationale was that although it may
be inequitable for Fidelity to retain its first priority mortgage lien against
the Peachtree property the court cannot pierce the corporate veil unless
it not only shows inequity but also shows some sort of abuse of the corporate form. Without misfeasance or malfeasance in maintaining the corporate form inequity alone is not a sufficient enough ground for a court to
pierce the corporate veil.
On remand, the district court made five specific findings of fact and
concluded that Skiba was Fidelity's alter ego.55 It found that Skiba served
as the sole director and president and controlled the business decisions of
Fidelity; that Skiba caused Fidelity to serve as an "informal" lender; that
Skiba ran all. the members of his "incestuous" group of corporations for
the benefit of Fidelity; that Skiba caused payments to be made from one
corporation he controlled to another corporation; and that Skiba caused
Fidelity to be thinly capitalized." The district court held these findings of
51. Id. at 1345-47.

52. Id. at 1348.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 920 F.2d 827, 835 (11th Cir. 1991).

56. Id.
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fact sufficient under Georgia law to support the conclusion that Fidelity
was Skiba's alter ego and found that Skiba's representations to Commonwealth bound Fidelity to admit that Commonwealth would have a first
7
mortgage interest.'
The Eleventh Circuit held the district court's findings of facts insufficient under Georgia law to permit the conclusion that Fidelity was
Skiba's alter ego." The court examined each of the district court's five
findings of fact and demonstrated that under Georgia law there could be
no piercing of the corporate veil.5 '
After reviewing the Georgia law concerning piercing, the Eleventh Circuit set up a two-prong piercing analysis.6 One prong of the analysis requires evidence of the use of the corporate form to defeat justice, perpetrate fraud, promote crime, evade contractual or tort responsibility, or
any other reason that in equity or good conscience would justify the disregard of the corporate entity.61 In addition to this equitable prong, the
court required another prong to show that the shareholders disregarded
the corporate entity and made it a "mere instrumentality" of the transaction of their own affairs, with evidence of abuse of the corporate entity"2
This additional prong is often called "mere instrumentality," "a unity of
interest," or "lack of separate identity that would result in injustice or
promotion of fraud." The court emphasized, however, that satisfaction of
this second prong requires evidence of abuse of the corporate form." Evidence would include commingling of corporate assets, failure to maintain
corporate records separately, and conduct of private and corporate business on an interchangeable or joint basis."
The Eleventh Circuit, as a reviewer of Georgia law, has articulated that
the "mere instrumentality" finding requires a true showing of abuse of
the corporate form before a court will be permitted to order a piercing of
the corporate veil. No Georgia court in recent years has been as articulate
about the Georgia piercing standards as the Eleventh Circuit in Fidelity.
The great value of the holding in Fidelity is its clear message that inequity alone will not justify piercing unless the "mere instrumentality" second prong is met, which will require evidence of abuse of the corporate
form. Too often, piercing is given as a remedy in cases of inequity when
no abuse is shown.
57. Id. at 835-36.
58. Id. at 836.

59. Id. at 836-39.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 836-37.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit, when exploring the inequitable prong of the
piercing analysis, added new language that has not been used by recent
Georgia courts and may signal a slight expansion of what Georgia courts
view as inequity. The standard formulation of the inequitable prong is
that there must be evidence of use of the corporate form to defeat justice,
perpetrate fraud, or evade contractual or tort responsibility. The Eleventh Circuit held that the inequitable prong is satisfied when it is shown
that the corporate form was used "to defeat justice, perpetuate fraud,
promote crime, evade contractual or tort responsibility, or for any other
reason which in equity or good conscience would justify the disregardof
the corporate entity."65
B. Pre-IncorporationActs
In Kelley v. RS&H of North Carolina, Inc.,60 the court of appeals reviewed a case that dealt with acts by a corporation's president and finan* cial investor made on behalf of the corporation before the proper formation of the corporation in Georgia or, if formed in another state, not
registered to do business in Georgia. RS&H of North Carolina ("RS&H"),
a North Carolina corporation, entered into a contract with Southern
Properties of Georgia, ("Southern") to provide engineering services for a
proposed real estate development project in Gwinnett County. Kelley
67
signed as president of Southern.
Before execution of the contract with RS&H, Kelley, as President of
Southern Properties, a North Carolina corporation, applied to the Secretary of State of Georgia for a certificate of authority to do business in
Georgia under the name of Southern. The Secretary of State denied the
certification several weeks after execution of the contract due to a name
conflict, and Kelley submitted a new application for certificate of authority using the name Southern Properties of N.C., Inc., which was granted.
RS&H did not discover that there was no corporation named Southern
until after it sued Kelley and MacConochie, a financial advisor, for
$61,681.68, for monies owed to RS&H. Kelley and MacConochie held
themselves out to be officers and employees of Southern, which did not
exist as a corporation at the time the parties entered into the contract
and no corporation was ever formed using that name. Kelley and MacConochie contended that there was no legal basis for personal liability on
their part.8
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 836-37 (emphasis added).
197 Ga. App. 236, 398 S.E.2d 213 (1990).
Id. at 236, 398 S.E.2d at 214.
Id. at 237, 398 S.E.2d at 215.
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The court phrased the issue as whether Kelley and MacConochie acted
as officers of an existing North Carolina corporation or on behalf of a
fictitious, nonexistent Georgia corporation."' The court reviewed former
section 14-2-23 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated 0 ("O.C.G.A.")
and concluded that persons who act on behalf of a corporation before the
corporation has been registered by the Secretary of State are individually
liable for the obligations undertaken as an agent for the to-be-formed corporation. 1 The court held that if Kelley and MacConochie acted for an
unregistered Georgia corporation they were liable for any of the debts
incurred."
Kelley and MacConochie contended that they acted for Southern
Properties, Inc., an existing North Carolina corporation and, that in the
contract with RS&H, they improperly used the incorrect corporate name
of Southern Properties of Georgia, Inc."3 The court held that the key to
resolving this issue concerned the intention of the parties as to which corporation was to be the contracting party." The facts presented to the
trial court indicated that Kelley and MacConochie repeatedly told RS&H
agents that they were contracting with a Georgia corporation. 5 Additionally, Kelley claimed that although he served as president of Southern
Properties, Inc. he had never drawn a pay check, never appeared for work
in North Carolina, did not know if the North Carolina corporation still
did business, and had no evidence of his election as president of that corporation or that he had ever been issued any of its stock.' 6
The court of appeals determined from the evidence that in judging the
intent of the parties, RS&H could not have intended to contract with
Southern Properties, Inc., a North Carolina corporation, because it had
never heard of that corporation and did not know it existed." Because
the trier 78of fact found in favor of RS&H, the court affirmed the verdict of
the jury.
In-Jones v. Burlington Industries, Inc.,"7 the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the action of the trial court in a suit by a seller on an unpaid
69. Id.
70. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-23 (1982).
71. 197 Ga. App. at 237, 398 S.E.2d at 215.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 238, 398 S.E.2d at 215.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court also reversed the jury charge concerning the amount owed under the
contract and what offsets could be allowed. Id.
79. 196 Ga. App. 834, 397 S.E.2d 174 (1990).
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account against an unincorporated defendant. 0 Burlington Industries established a line of credit with an unincorporated entity named RBJ Textiles in mid-1986. On September 12, 1986, an agent of Burlington Industries noted that RBJ's Textiles name had been changed to "Ronnie B.
Jones, Inc. d/b/a RBJ Textiles." The unpaid account related to goods
purchased from Burlington Industries by appellate between April and
June 1987. 81
The trial court found no evidence of the formation of a corporation
using the name Ronnie B. Jones or RBJ Textiles, but in March 1987 a
corporation was formed called "RonJon, Inc." that Jones admitted he
never mentioned to Burlington Industries.2 The court concluded that the
trial court had acted properly in holding Jones personally liable for the
debt."
C. Derivative Actions
In Phoenix Airline Services, Inc. v. Metro Airlines, Inc.,' the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and court of appeals in a derivative action alleging wrongful appropriation of corporate business opportunities. 5 Officers and key employees of Metro Express, Inc. ("Metro Express"), whose sole shareholder is Metro Airlines, Inc. ("Metro Airlines"),
left Metro Express and immediately began Airlines I, Inc. ("Airlines I"),
which is owned by Phoenix Airlines Services, Inc ("Phoenix"). Metro Express and Metro Airlines filed an action against the employees of Airlines
I and Phoenix, alleging that the employees usurped a corporate opportunity and breached fiduciary duties and that Airlines I and Phoenix directly resulted from the usurped corporate opportunity. Airlines I and
Phoenix responded by moving to dismiss Metro Airlines on the grounds
that it was a shareholder and as such any action by Metro Airlines should
have been a derivative action. A motion for directed verdict on this same
issue was later made and the court denied both the motion to dismiss and
the motion for directed verdict. 6
Pursuant to the grant of writ of certiorari, the one question that the
supreme court had to decide was "[dlid the court of appeals misconstrue
the law by creating a new, non-derivative right of action in a stockholder
against an officer, director or key employee of a corporation?" Put an80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 838, 397 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 834, 397 S.E.2d at 175.
Id.
Id. at 838, 397 S.E.2d at 177.
260 Ga. 584, 397 S.E.2d 699 (1990).
Id. at 587, 397 S.E.2d at 703.
Id. at 584, 397 S.E.2d at 701.
Id., 397 S.E.2d at 700.
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other way the question is whether or not the stockholder, Metro Airlines
could bring a direct claim against the defendants Airlines I and Phoenix,
as opposed to a derivative claim, since Metro Airlines was a shareholder
of Metro Express, the entity that allegedly suffered the injury through
the corporate opportunity usurpation. The supreme court stated that the
main issue in the complaint concerned whether the employees breached
their fiduciary duties and usurped corporate opportunities.' Quoting a
federal district court applying Delaware law, 89 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the general rule is that actions for breach of fiduciary
duty are to be brought in derivative suits, even when the individual is a
sole stockholder, because actions seeking to recover for usurped corporate
opportunities belong to the corporation."
The court also found that there are exceptions to the general rule if the
shareholder alleges a "'special injury' that would allow a personal cause
of action." 91 Metro Airlines alleged that it argued in a particular paragraph of its complaint that such a "special injury" claim existed.2 The
Georgia Supreme Court, quoting a Delaware state court case,"3 stated
that the distinction between derivative and individual actions rests upon
the party being directly injured by the alleged wrongdoing. 4 If the
wrongdoing is against the corporation then the stockholders' only alternative is to sue derivatively. If the injuries are done to the stockholders in
their individual capacities by corporate fiduciaries, then they may sue by
bringing direct actions either as individuals or as a class. The court also
explained the requirements of a derivative action under Georgia law and
then set forth its conclusion that to have standing to sue individually,
rather than derivatively on behalf of the corporation, the plaintiff must
allege more than an injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation."
The court noted that to sue as an individual in a direct action and not a
derivative action, the wrong must involve something unique to the stockholder, separate and distinct from injuries suffered by other
shareholders."
Considering these standards, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
paragraph in the complaint specified by the plaintiffs did not allege an
injury to the stockholder in its individual capacity by the corporate fidu88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 585, 397 S.E.2d at 701.
Cole v. Ford Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
260 Ga. at 585, 397 S.E.2d at 701.
Id.
Id.
Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348 (Del. 1988).
260 Ga. at 585-86, 397 S.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 586, 397 S.E.2d at 702.
Id.
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ciaries and, therefore, the stockholder suffered no separate or distinct injuries and could not sue individually. 7 The court held that the trial court,
therefore, erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss or
motion for directed verdict as to Metro Airlines." The authors believe
this case especially well reasoned by the Supreme Court of Georgia and
should prove to be a helpful building block and guide in going beyond the
Georgia Business Corporation Code" in understanding derivative actions.
The Georgia Supreme Court decided another derivative action case in
Hacienda Corp. v. White.10 0 A majority shareholder, sole director, and
president of a corporation, White Valley Farms, Inc., failed to give proper
statutory notice 01 of a meeting to the minority shareholder. In the challenged meeting, the shareholders decided to transfer the assets of the corporation to Hacienda Corporation. An executor of the estate of a minority
shareholder brought a derivation action against White Valley Farms, Inc.
to set aside the deed by which it had transferred the assets to Hacienda
Corporation. In addition to alleging a failure to give proper notice, the
executor alleged that the deed was invalid because a second corporate
officer did not attest the deed and it did not contain the corporate seal of
the corporation. The trial court upheld the executor's right to bring the
shareholder derivative action and set the deed aside.oa
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the failure to comply with the
notice provisions of a shareholder meeting did not give rise to a shareholder's derivative action.103 In so holding, the court stated that the purpose of the derivative action is to protect the corporation and its assets,
and a violation of the notice provisions may not be asserted by the corporation itself to invalidate its own transaction.' The court also stated that
a cause of action for a violation of the notice provisions belongs to the
shareholder and not the corporation, and that there are sufficient alternative remedies to the minority shareholders for the alleged breach of such
provisions. 105
The court also held that the lack of corporate seal and attestation is
not conclusive evidence that the corporate officer executing a deed lacks
corporate authority to do so.106 O.C.G.A. section 14-5-7107 provides that
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 587, 397 S.E.2d at 702.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
260 Ga. 879, 400 S.E.2d 323 (1991).
The allegation was that the corporation had failed to give notice under former

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-231(2) (1988).
102. 260 Ga. at 879, 400 S.E.2d at 324.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 879-80, 400 S.E.2d at 324-25.
Id. at 880, 400 S.E.2d at 325.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-5-7 (1989).
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the presence of a corporate seal and attestation by another corporate officer is "conclusive evidence that said officers signing are duly authorized
to execute and deliver the same" but that a lack of the corporate seal and
attestation does not mean that an officer does not have the authority. 10 8
Therefore, the court reversed on both issues and remanded the case to
the trial court for additional proceedings. 10'
During the survey period, in Peller v.Southern Co.,110 the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed a federal district court decision, in which ultimately it
was determined that Delaware law governed to excuse a plaintiff in a derivative action from making a demand on the corporation prior to bringing suit."' The Eleventh Circuit determined that it did not need to apply
Georgia law to reach its holding in this case and focused on a discussion
of the Delaware case Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.1 The district court's
review of Peller has been discussed previously in the Mercer Law Review1" and has some relevance in that the district court assumed Georgia
courts would follow Zapata in considering the situation of a special committee of a board of director's investigation and decision related to a derivative action brought by shareholders. Although not adopted by any
Georgia appellate court, Peller may be of guidance and should be reviewed by counsel to Georgia corporations that form11special committees
to review derivation action demands of shareholders. '
D. No Disparagement Clause
In City Group, Inc. v. Ehlers,115 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's opinion concerning statements made by a former Presi-%
dent of City Group, Inc. after his signing of a severance agreement that
included a "no disparagement" clause."' Ehlers brought an action to collect a balance allegedly due on a promissory note executed by City Group,
Inc., and guaranteed by another defendant. Defendants' counterclaim alleged damages due to a breach of a severance agreement executed contemporaneously with the promissory note. A severance agreement clause
provided that the parties would "refrain from any disparagement of the
108. Id.
109. 260 Ga. at 881, 400 S.E.2d at 326.
110. 911 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 1537-38.
112. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
113. See Paul A. Quirds & Michael L. Chapman, Business Associations, 41
Rzv.45, 53-56 (1989).
114. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-744 (1989).
115. 198 Ga. App. 709, 402 S.E.2d 787 (1991).
116. Id. at 709, 402 S.E.2d at 787-88.

Mzncz

L.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

100

[Vol. 43

character, personal, professional or business conduct, and personal, professional or business activities of each other."" 7 The Atlanta Business
Chronicle contacted Ehlers and asked him about his resignation. Ehlers
stated that he left due to "philosophical differences," and he proceeded to
give the Business Chronicle a short paragraph on his disagreement with
the other partners, including the fact that it was hard to "define the direction of the company."'"
For guidance, the court looked to Webster's Third New International
Dictionary to discover the common meaning of the term "disparagement"
and stated that it agreed with the trial court that no reasonable interpretation of Ehlers' comments would be considered disparaging. 1' The court
therefore held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to
Ehlers.'"
Separation of executive officers is a fact of corporate life in Georgia and
so is freedom of the press. It is predictable that statements made after a
senior executive departs from a company may be interpreted differently.
Ehlers reminds all Georgia practitioners that in drafting separation
agreements or consulting and employment agreements that contemplate
future separation, it is helpful to work out phraseology acceptable to both
parties that will address third party inquiries. The language worked out
between the parties should provide for exceptions such as litigation and
public company disclosure issues but can routinely be worked out in such
a way as to avoid appellate court litigation.
E. Legislative Changes
During the 1991 session, the legislature enacted the new "Georgia Nonprofit Corporation Code."11'2 These provisions closely parallel the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act in most respects. Additionally, the legislature changed the time of payment for corporate income taxes. The
new dates are March 15, following the close of the calendar year, or the
fifteenth day of the third month following the close of the corporation's
1 22
fiscal year.
Another bill dealt with situations when bids for public work contracts
are made by two or more affiliated corporations and the lower bid is later
rescinded. 123 In this situation, the security posted by bid bond or other117.
118.
119.
120.

Id., 402 S.E.2d at 788.
Id. at 710, 402 S.E.2d at 788.
Id.
Id.

121. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-3-101 to -1703 (Supp. 1991).

122. HB 338.
123. HB 463.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

1991]

wise is forfeited for each corporation."2 4 The legislature also clarified that
both domestic and foreign corporations have insurable interests in their
key employees and that trusts created for the benefit of such corporations
hold the same interest. This act also provides that charitable institutions
have an insurable interest in the life of a donor.12 8 Certain other bills
dealt with the powers of business development corporations,'" the Georgia Residential Finance Authority provisions relating to multi-family residential rental properties,127 the revenue bond law,1 28 the creation of a new
Georgia Housing & Finance Authority, '" and the investment of proceeds
from issued bonds.18 0
II.

PARTNERSHIPS

Partnership cases during the survey period addressed issues concerning
liability of partners to third parties, the existence of a partnership relationship, and the duties of copartners.
A. Liability for Debts
In Shea v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,'$' the court of appeals
considered the liability of partners in a general partnership for workers
compensation insurance premiums even though the partnership subsequently incorporated.1 2 The general partners neglected to inform State
Farm that the partnership had incorporated, and State Farm sued to recover premiums due on insurance policies in effect prior to the date on
which State Farm became aware of the incorporation of the
partnership. 8
The former partners argued that the trial court should have ruled that
the incorporation dissolved the general partnership and barred the individual partners from liability.' The court of appeals decided, however,
that the trial court's ruling did not involve principles of dissolution and
continued liability and refused to analyze those principles on appeal. 8 5
The court of appeals emphasized that the former partners failed to advise
124. Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

SB 154.
SB 34.
SB 35.
SB 42.
SB 95.
SB 175.
198 Ga. App. 790, 403 S.E.2d 81 (1991).
Id. at 790, 403 S.E.2d at 82.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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State Farm of the partnership's change of status and that State Farm
continued to look to the partners and the partnership for payment of premiums.'" The court held that the partners contracted with the insurer as
a partnership and therefore had a duty to advise the insurer of their
so that the insurer would look to
change in status when they incorporated
8 7
the corporation for payment.

Often, clients who ask attorneys to incorporate their businesses have
been operating as sole proprietorships or partnerships prior to incorporation. As such they often enter into contracts and otherwise bind themselves individually. Clients who have recently incorporated should notify
vendors and other contractual parties in writing of the change in formation status and should seek to make the new corporations liable, through
assumption or direct contract, in order to benefit from limited individual
liability status as soon as possible.
B. PartnershipRelationship
In Ambase InternationalCorp. v. BankSouth, N.A., 18 plaintiff argued
that defendant bank's involvement in debt restructuring rose to the level
of transforming the relationship between the parties from that of borrower-lender into a partnership or joint venture. Plaintiff executed a commercial installment note in favor of defendant in the principal amount of
$300,000 and executed a security agreement giving defendant a security
interest in the equipment, inventory, and accounts receivable of plaintiff.
Plaintiff's parent corporation and its chairman of the board guaranteed
the loan and owed amounts to the bank under other notes. After plaintiff
and its parent corporation failed to make installment payments on their
notes, bank representatives met with the parties to propose alternatives
for retiring the debts of plaintiff and its parent corporation. Defendant
allowed plaintiff and its parent corporation to establish collateral accounts for the purpose of depositing all accounts receivable and, at defendant's direction, transferring funds into the operating accounts of the
two companies. For the next seven months, neither party made payments
of principal due under the notes, and the parent corporation engaged in
negotiations for the proposed sale of its customer list. This transaction
required approval of defendant bank, which withheld such approval. A
few months later, defendant declared the notes in default and applied the
funds in the collateral accounts to the collective indebtedness. The parent
corporation's note was paid in full, but plaintiff's note still had an out136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 196 Ga. App. 336, 395 S.E.2d 904 (1990).
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standing principal balance even after the sale of assets of plaintiff and its
parent corporation.13'
.Plaintiff first argued that defendant did not conduct the sale of assets
in a commercially reasonable manner. However, the trial court found that
written contracts proved that plaintiff and its parent corporation, rather
than defendant, were the sellers. 4 0 Plaintiff maintained that a relationship other than that of borrower-lender arose between the parties, and
argued that a bank representative referred to plaintiff's and bank's relationship as a partnership, that defendant took over the day-to-day operations of the two companies, and that forbearance from collecting the indebtedness transformed the relationship into a partnership or joint
14
venture. 1
The court determined that the record contained evidence of defendant's, efforts to work with plaintiff on a regular basis toward defendant's
goal of retiring the loans and found that all of defendant's actions affirmatively showed that the relationship continued as one of borrower-lender
rather than as a joint venture." 2 Additionally, the court stated that
"'even if a joint venture was shown to exist, the [plaintiff has] not
demonstrated how this would preclude the bank from enforcing the clear
and unambiguous terms of the [notes they signed].' ",48
In the environmental context, lenders who have become involved in the
management of a debtor, even in the role of protecting their secured position, have been held liable as operators under environmental recovery
provisions." The court of appeals refused in this case to consider the
relationship between these parties as other than that of borrowerlender. ' The court could not determine how characterizing of the relationship as a partnership or a joint venture would benefit plaintiff, nor
did the court find that a public policy consideration existed to
6
recharacterize the parties' relationship.'

139. Id. at 336-37, 395 S.E.2d at 906.
140. Id. at 337, 395 S.E.2d at 907.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 339, 395 S.E.2d at 908 (citing Dolanson Co. v. C&S Nat'l Bank, 242 Ga. 681,
251 S.E.2d 274 (1978)).
143. Id. (quoting Dolanson, 242 Ga. at 684, 251 S.E.2d at 274).
144. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (a secured
creditor may incur liability without participating in the day to day operations of the business if such creditor participates in the financial management to a degree indicating capacity to influence the owner's treatment of hazardous waste).
145. 196 Ga. App. at 338-39, 395 S.E.2d at 907-08.
146. Id.
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C. No Duty to Inquire
In Lehman v. Zuckerman," " the court of appeals examined the confidential relationship between two partners as it related to a duty to inquire and reasonable reliance. 14 8 Lehman, an experienced builder, and
Zuckerman, a real estate investor, formed a construction company in
which Lehman served as manager and Zuckerman obtained financing for
projects. Zuckerman contributed his own funds when required to complete projects and the parties executed a memorandum of understanding
in which Lehman agreed to repay Zuckerman for previous advances. Lehman refused to pay, and Zuckerman sued to recover the principal balance
and interest due under the memorandum of understanding. Lehman asserted a counterclaim for fraud and breach of a stock transfer agreement.
The trial court awarded judgment to Zuckerman. 49
Lehman argued in his counterclaim that Zuckerman fraudulently procured his acceptance of the memorandum of understanding and attempted to collect sums to which Zuckerman had no entitlement. The
court of appeals found evidence to support a charge to the jury on fraud
with respect to expenditures for which Zuckerman sought reimbursement.1 " The court ruled against the trial court's charge concerning a
party's claim of fraud, which stated that one could not be defrauded concerning a matter in which no confidential relationship existed between
the parties and both parties had access to information." The trial court
also charged that a party must exercise ordinary diligence in making an
independent verification of a contractual term, but noted that if a confidential relationship existed between partners, each owed a duty of utmost
good faith to the other and each partner could rely on the representations
made by the other partner.152 The court of appeals determined that in
this case there was sufficient evidence of a confidential relationship between Zuckerman and Lehman, who served as equal partners in the construction company, and, therefore, Lehman could reasonably rely on representations made by Zuckerman with respect to advances, without
making an independent examination of the advances before signing the
1 53
memorandum of understanding.
147. 198 Ga. App. 202, 400 S.E.2d 704 (1990).
148. Id. at 205-06, 400 S.E.2d at 708.
149. Id. at 203, 400 S.E.2d at 706.

150. Id. at 205, 400 S.E.2d at 708.
151. Id. at 205-06, 400 S.E.2d at 708.
152. Id. at 206, 400 S.E.2d at 708 (citing Allen v. Sanders, 176 Ga. App. 647, 337 S.E.2d
428 (1985)).
153. Id. (citing Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 334 S.E. 2d 428 (1985)).
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Legislative Changes

During the 1991 session, the legislature amended the Georgia Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act"6 to allow a limited partnership to indemnify and hold harmless any partner or other person, subject to express limitations found in the agreement of limited partnership. 65 This
indemnification power is subject to qualification for intentional misconduct or actions resulting in a breach of a partnership agreement.'
III.

BANKING

A. Acquisition of Branch Banks
In First National Bank v. Community Bankers Association,'57 the Supreme Court of Georgia considered an important issue regarding the ability of depository institutions in Georgia to expand their operations.158
The court of appeals determined that the Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Banking & Finance ("Commissioner") should not have approved a bank holding company's application for the proposed acquisition
by its subsidiary of certain "branch banks" of other banking institutions.
The Community Bankers Association of Georgia ("Community"), a trade
association comprised of 291 state and national banks in Georgia, opposed the acquisition, and the court of appeals decided in favor of Community.155 The supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether
under the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 7-1-600(1)1O a "branch bank" is
154. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-9-100 to -1204 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
155. HB 739.
156. Id.
157. 260 Ga. 371, 394 S.E.2d 95 (1990).
158. Id. at 371, 394 S.E.2d at 95 (affirming Community Bankers Ass'n v. First Nat'l
Bank, 193 Ga. App. 569, 388 S.E.2d 387 (1989)). See Quir6s & Magruder, supra note 20, at
71.
159. 260 Ga. at 371, 394 S.E.2d at 96.
160. Id. at 371-73, 394 S.E.2d at 96. "Bank shall include 'bank office,' 'bank facility,'
'parent bank,' and 'branch bank' unless the context indicates that it does not." O.C.G.A. §
7-1-600(1) (1989). "'Branch bank' means any additional principal place of business of any
parent bank located in a county other than the county which is specified in the articles of
the parent bank and wherein the parent bank is situated." O.C.G.A. § 7-1-600(5) (1989).
In the event of merger or consolidation of two or more banks ... where all of the
constituent banks shall have either a parent bank or a branch bank located in the
same county, then the surviving or resulting bank ... may retain and continue to
operate any or all places of business of each constituent bank as either a branch
bank, a bank office, or a bank facility, as is consistent with and may be authorized
by this part. In the event of the purchase of substantially all of the assets of a
bank.... where both the selling and the purchasing banks shall have either a
parent bank or branch bank in the same county, then the purchasing bank shall
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similar enough to a "bank" so that the acquisition of a "branch bank" of
one bank by another bank holding company's banking subsidiary will allow the subsidiary to operate the acquired branch bank as its own branch
bank within the acquired branch bank's county.1
The court examined legislative intent to. determine if the General Assembly intended that a bank, by acquiring a branch bank from a second
bank, could extend the first bank's activities into another county by operating the acquired branch bank as its own branch. 16" The court discovered a legislative directive that "[iut is the intent of this act to prevent
the extension of statewide banking by any institution and to encourage
the normal growth of banking units in the local communities ... and to
keep banking units from expanding into territories beyond their municipal corporate limits. r1, s The court held, therefore, that a branch bank
could not be considered the same as a bank under O.C.G.A. section 7-1600(1) for the purposes of the merger and consolidation provisions found
in O.C.G.A. section 7-1-602(e), which allow surviving or resulting banks to
retain or continue to operate in all places of business where constituent
banks were located before the merger or consolidation.'
In an appendix to this decision the court examined the entire statutory
scheme dealing with the interrelationships between parent banks, branch
banks, and banking operations."' The court refused to allow defendant
bank to circumvent the intent of the legislature to require the purchase of
an entire banking operation rather than the purchase of branch banks in
any locality in which a bank desired to operate a facility as its own
branch.'"
In dissent, Justice Fletcher decided the question the court should
consider was whether the Commissioner could approve a bank holding combe the parent bank and may retain and continue to operate any or all places of
business of the selling bank as either a branch bank, a bank office, or a bank
facility, as is consistent with and may be authorized by this part.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-602(e) (1989).
[A] bank holding company which lawfully controls a bank or has received the requisite approvals under this Code section to acquire control of a bank may, with
the approval of the commissioner ... merge or consolidate such bank with another of such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries or have another of
such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries acquire all or substantially all
of the assets of such bank and consequently operate as a branch of such other
banking subsidiary.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-606(e) (1989).
161. 260 Ga. at 371, 394 S.E.2d at 96.
162. Id. at 373, 394 S.E.2d at 97.
163. Id. at 373-74, 394 S.E.2d at 97 (citing 1960 Ga. Laws 68).
164. Id. at 374, 394 S.E.2d at 97 (citing O.C.G.A. § 7-1-602(e) (1989)).
165. Id. at 374-76, 394 S.E.2d at 97-99.
166. Id. at 374, 394 S.E.2d at 97.
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pany's acquisition of less than all of the branches of a seller bank instead
of acquiring the entire banking operations. 16 7 Justice Fletcher felt that
the court should be guided by the latest expression of legislative intent
and amendments to the banking laws after the 1960 Act,168 which allowed
exceptions to the general prohibition against the establishment of additional banks by large financial interests that -would destroy independent
banks and result in a concentration of control of the banking industry.1' 9
Fletcher felt that recent banking legislation illustrated a movement toward a philosophy that larger financial institutions might offer a variety
of services that would better provide for the needs of customers.7
With the recent acquisitions of banking operations in Georgia by large
out-of-state bank holding companies, the dissent seems to be more in
touch with the economic reality of the banking business at this time. One
can make the argument, however, that the majority decision may protect
the continued existence of true independent community banking
operations.
B.

Commercial Unreasonableness

In Apcoa, Inc. v.Fidelity National Bank, 1 an action arising from an
embezzlement scheme by employees of a parking lot owner, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed an order by the'district court granting summary judgment against defendant bank. 72 The district court held that the bank
breached a contractual arrangement with plaintiff and could not assert
defenses in connection with the opening of two unauthorized accounts.
The company deposited the parking lot revenues into authorized depository accounts, and corporate officers withdrew the funds and placed them
in the main corporate account located out of state. The Atlanta office of
the company did not maintain any corporate accounts to pay expenses.
The company opened two depository accounts at defendant bank pursuant to corporate authorization sent from the Cleveland main office. Parking lot revenues .received in Atlanta were to be deposited in these accounts and checks and drafts could be made or drawn against these funds
when signed by two of four designated individuals. The forms provided to
the bank listed only officers from the Cleveland office and did not include
as designated signatories any employees located in Atlanta.187
167. Id. at 376-77, 394 S.E.2d at 99 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 378, 394 S.E.2d at 100 (citing 1960 Ga. Laws 68) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (citing Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Dunn, 230 Ga. 345, 360, 197 S.E.2d 129,
138 (1973)) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 379, 197 S.E.2d at 101 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
171. 906 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1990).
172. Id. at 615.
173. Id. at 611-12.
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Certain employees in the Atlanta office opened other accounts at defendant bank without corporate resolutions, authorization, or certificates
executed by officers or authorized officials, and listed local employees as
the authorized signatories. The bank sent the statements for these accounts to the Atlanta office, and the bank presented no evidence that the
main office had any knowledge of these accounts. The local employees
deposited receipts from the parking lot into these accounts and wrote
checks against these accounts as part of the embezzlement scheme. "
When the parking lot owners sued the bank, the bank raised the defense of commercial reasonableness. The court of appeals stated that the
rule in Georgia is "whether a reasonable man in accordance with reasonable commercial standards will be put on notice of some impropriety appearing either from the form of the instrument and its endorsements or
from knowledge of the facts outside the instrument itself."' ' The court
also refused to accept defenses based on allegations of the parking lot
owner's negligence1 7 6 or apparent authority.1

77

The court found that the

bank's conduct had not been reasonable and that the bank should have
been on notice because of the impropriety in the form of the instruments
and from its knowledge of facts outside the face of the instruments.7'6 A
finding of commercial unreasonableness negated the negligence defense
and the court found no evidence1 7 that any apparent authority existed with
respect to the local employees. '
C. Misapplication of Funds
In LaBanz v. BankSouth, Macon,8 0 the court of appeals decided that
punitive damages and attorney fees could not be awarded against defendant bank under circumstances in which the bank officials were unaware
that plaintiff's mother misapplied the funds received from insurance
checks subject to guardianship when she negotiated the checks."6 " The
court failed to accept plaintiff's argument that the endorsements required
by the checks constituted restrictive endorsements under the Uniform
174.

Id.at 613.

175. Id. (citing Trust Co. of Georgia Bank v. Port Terminal & Warehousing Co., 153 Ga.
App. 735, 266 S.E.2d 254 (1980)). See O.C.G.A. § 11-3-419(3) (1982), which requires that a

defendant act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards in order to raise an affirmative defense to a conversion claim.
176. 906 F.2d at 614 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-3-406 (1982)).
177. Id. (citing Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 198 Ga. App. 79, 400 S.E.2d 357 (1990).

181. Id. at 82, 400 S.E.2d at 359.
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Commercial Code as adopted in Georgia"'3 and that the bank failed to
apply the proceeds in accordance with such endorsements."' The court
concluded that the signature requirements constituted endorsements in
blank' and refused to consider as a restrictive endorsement the designation of the payee as a fiduciary.188
Plaintiff's mother used proceeds from two life insurance policies, payable to her as guardian for plaintiff, to purchase property and to secure
other loans from the bank. Eventually the bank foreclosed upon the real
property and all other assets of plaintiff's mother held by the bank.18 6
The court accepted the bank's contention that its liability remained separate from that of the guardian and had to be predicated upon its own
participation, rather than merely by the negotiation of the checks. The
bank argued that it had no notice of the conversion of the funds. 87 Because the court found no factual basis for liability, it did not impose attorney fees or punitive damages." 8
The court decided that the only issue concerning liability was whether
the bank knew of the guardianship and still allowed the distribution of
the funds.1 89 The court refused to rule that the bank should have known.
of the guardianship status, although it seems clear that the bank had notice from the face of the check that some type of guardianship was involved because the check stated that it was payable to Ms. LaBanz as
guardian for the property of her son, a minor.
D. Restructuring of Loan
In Bangs v. Farm Credit Bank,"' the court of appeals refused to require a bank to approve an application for restructuring of a loan, when
defendant borrowers refused to pledge additional capital after the bank,
in good faith, determined that the restructuring would exceed the foreclosure costs.1 91 Defendants argued that the Farm Credit Act of 1971192 required consideration of certain factors in a bank's determination of
182. See O.C.G.A. § 11-3-101 to -805 (1982 & Supp. 1991).
183. 198 Ga. App. at 82-83, 400 S.E.2d at 360. See O.C.G.A. if 11-3-205 (1982) and 11-3206 (1982).
184. 198 Ga. App. at 83, 400 S.E.2d at 360 (citing O.C.G.A. f 11-3-204(2) (1982)).
185. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-3-117(b)(1982)).
186. Id. at 81, 400 S.E.2d at 358.
187. Id. at 81-82, 400 S.E.2d at 359.
188. Id. at 82, 400 S.E.2d at 359 (citing Trust Co. Bank v. Henderson, 185 Ga. App. 367,
364 S.E.2d 289 (1987), affd, 258 Ga. 703, 373 S.E.2d 738 (1988)).
189. Id.
190. 196 Ga. App. 208, 396 S.E.2d 6 (1990).
191. Id. at 210, 396 S.E.2d at 8.
192. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2279 (1988).
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whether or not to approve a restructuring application.'" The court refused to consider whether defendant borrowers had a private right of action or a right to assert defenses under the Farm Credit Act."' The court
based its decision on uncontroverted evidence that the bank considered
each of the factors described in the Farm Credit Act, including whether
the cost of restructuring exceeded the cost of foreclosure, and whether the
borrower was applying all available income toward the payment of its primary obligations. 195
E. Legislative Changes
During its 1991 session, the legislature enacted laws to (1) amend the
Retail Installment and Home Solicitation Sales Act and contract statutes
relating to damages for writing bad checks, 19' (2) provide that a revolving
account could charge for delinquencies on installments not paid within
ten days of due date, 1 7 (3) amend provisions relating to licensed check
cashers,98 and (4) prohibit merchants from requiring telephone numbers
on credit card transactions and from imprinting credit cards or recording
credit card numbers as a condition to accepting checks from purchas*ers.1 9 Additionally, the legislature enacted a measure that provides a limited good faith immunity from civil liability for directors and officers of
financial institutions required by the Department of Banking and Finance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or other agencies to
provide information regarding the appearance or suspicion of criminal activity involving directors,
officers, agents, employees, or customers of the
20 0
financial institutions.
IV. SECURITIES
During the survey period, the courts decided such issues as whether
lots in a beach club development were securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"),' 0' whether a defendant acted as a dealer for the purposes of the Georgia Securities
Act,' 02 whether exemptions from securities regulations applied in certain
193. 196 Ga. App. at 210, 396 S.E.2d at S.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. HB 47.

197.
198.
199.
200.

HB 293.
HB 383.
SB 39.
SB 162.

201.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to -7811 (1988).

202. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-5-1 to -2 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
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cases,203 and whether misrepresentations in a prospectus204violated the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act").
A. Definition of a Security
In Rice v. BranigarOrganization,Inc.,'"3 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that lots in a beach club development and equity membership contracts in a country club were not securities for purposes of the
Exchange Act.2 " Defendants constructed a residentially planned unit development on a barrier island off the coast of Georgia and as a part of the
development built a large country club. The purchase price of a house or
lot did not include initiation fees and dues but all residents could join the
country club as nonequity members by paying such fees. Defendants later
created a nonprofit corporation to own the club and its facilities. The
nonequity members of the club lost their usage rights and only members
owning an equity interest were allowed to continue using the club. 07
The court applied an investment contract analysis20 8 to determine
whether the Exchange Act applied and found that the purchase of an
asset for use or consumption precludes the application of federal securities laws.2' 9 The court did not believe that beach lots are purchased with
the intent to derive profits from the entrepreneurial efforts of the developers of the lots. Plaintiffs did not offer evidence that they purchased the
lots and houses for investment, and the promotional materials used to sell
the lots did not emphasize purchase for investment.210
Additionally, the court examined the economic reality of the club membership contracts and found that persons purchased such memberships in
order to make use of the club facilities, rather than as investments.2 " The
court examined promotional materials and found that they emphasized
use of the club's facilities rather than investment potential.2 12
The court failed to consider that some people do:buy beach lots or
homes for investment purposes and that club memberships are an important part of the marketing effort to rent beach property. The court's ap203. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-9 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
205. 922 F.2d 788 (l1th Cir. 1991).

206. Id. at 790.
207. Id. at 789.
208. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 387 (1975),
209. 922 F.2d at 790 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 387 (1975)).
210. Id. at 791 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 853).
211. Id.
212. Id. Additionally, the court dismissed claims of fraud brought pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1701 to -20 (1988)) relating to the nonequity memberships. 922 F.2d at 791-92.
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plication of the investment contract analysis, however, was probably correct because the owners in this situation did not rely solely upon the
entrepreneurial efforts of others.
B. Sales of UnregisteredSecurities
1 8 the court of appeals upheld a criminal convicIn Greenhill v.State,"
tion of an unregistered salesperson for selling unregistered securities in a
fraudulent manner.2 Defendant represented himself as a publisher of
Bibles and received loans from Harvey Starr ("Starr") and other investors, Starr later found that the publishing business was not an active business and had never published Bibles as defendant had alleged. Defendant stated he obtained monies from Starr as personal loans to use for any
21
purpose. 1
Defendant argued that the 1986 repeal and reenactment of O.C.G.A.
section 10-5-12,1e without a saving clause, should have abated the prosecution against him. The court decided that a savings clause is not the
only way to validate a prosecution after the law in effect at the time of
the commission of the prohibited conduct has been repealed. 217 The court
decided that legislative intent could override the lack of a savings clause
if the conduct remained a crime despite the redefinition of the statute.218
The court also stated that a defendant has the burden of proving that a
transaction is exempt from registration under the state securities laws
and that defendant did not meet his burden.21 The court found that defendant acted as a salesman -pursuant to Georgia securities laws and willfully violated such laws by selling unregistered securities and employing a
fraudulent device.220
Additionally, the court applied a four year statute of limitations and
found that the statutory period begins to run upon the state's knowledge
of a violation including knowledge imputed to the state by interested or
injured parties. 22 Although this case dealt with violations of the Georgia
securities laws rather than federal securities laws, federal courts have
213. 199 Ga. App. 218, 404 S.E.2d 577 (1991).
214. Id. at 218-21, 404 S.E.2d at 580-81.
215. Id. at 218, 404 S.E.2d at 579.
216. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12 (1991). Section 12(a)(1) contains the Georgia equivalent of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
217. 199 Ga. App. at 219, 404 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Barrett v. State, 183 Ga. App. 729,
360 S.E.2d 400 (1987)).
218. Id. (citing State v. Benzaquen, 184 Ga. App. 392, 361 S.E.2d 503 (1987)).
219. Id. at 220, 404 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 57, 76 S.E.2d 38
(1953)).
220. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 581.
221. Id. at 221, 404 S.E.2d at 581 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2(2) (1990); Duncan v. State,
193 Ga. App. 793, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989)).
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been applying the most analogous state limitations period in determining
the limitations period for violations of the federal securities laws. Re222
the
cently in Lamph, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
United States Supreme Court decided that federal securities law claims
would have the statutory limitations period provided in Section 9 of the
Exchange Act.21
C.

Rescission and Controlling Person Liability

In Binder v. Gordian Securities, Inc.,22 the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia decided that, in a transaction exempt from
registration under the Georgia Securities Act,2 2 6 defendants' offers of rescission did not bar plaintiffs' suit.2 2 6 The court found that the rescission
offers made by defendants did not meet the requirements of O.C.G.A.
227
section 10-5-14(d)(1).
The court determined that although defendants complied with Regulation D of the Securities Act," 5 they did not have to comply with the uniform limited offering exemption of the Georgia Securities Act. Instead
defendants could comply with any exemption found in such act.' 9
An individual defendant argued that he was not a controlling person
for the purposes of controlling person liability under the federal or state
securities laws.' 0° If a plaintiff meets his burden of establishing that a
defendant is a controlling person under the securities laws, the defendant

222. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
223. Id. at 2780-82; see also John L. Latham & Lynn Scott Magruder, Securities Regulation, 42 MERCER L REV. 1519 (1991).
224. 742 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
225. Id. at 666-67. See O.C.G.A. 10-5-9 (1991). Defendants stated in their Private Placement Memorandum that they relied on § 3(b) and § 4(2) of the Securities Act for exemptions from registration and complied with Regulation D. Defendants did not rely on Georgia's Uniform Limited Offering Exemption but relied on the exemption of § 10-5-9(13) of
the Georgia Act. 742 F. Supp. at 665-66.
226. 742 F. Supp. at 666 (citing O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(d) (1991)).
227. Id. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(d) (1991) requires a rescission offer to (1) offer repayment of
investors' consideration; (2) within thirty days of acceptance of the offer; and (3) to pay
interest accrued thereon.
228. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1991).
229. 742 F. Supp. at 666. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-9(13) (1991) allows an exemption for offerings
with less than 15 purchasers in the state and that did not involve any general solicitation or
advertisement. Purchasers executed agreements concerning their investment intent. Additionally, the certificates representing the limited partnership interest contained the required
legend referring to this exemption. 742 F. Supp. at 666.
230. 742 F. Supp. at 667. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act contains the description of
controlling person liability and similar language is found in the Georgia Securities Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) and O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(c) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
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must then assert a good faith affirmative defense to such allegations. 8
Defendant must allege "that he had 'no knowledge of or reasonable
grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is said to exist,' ,22 and that he "'acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.' ,,23s The court found that
the individual defendant ("Thompson") correctly alleged that his status
as an officer did not automatically make him a controlling person, but
that the standard required consideration of whether Thompson "'had the
requisite power to directly or indirectly control or influence corporate policy.'",, The court determined that Thompson was a controlling person
and although he might have lacked actual knowledge of illegalities and
did not induce such illegalities, he might have had reason to know of such
illegalities and therefore would have acted recklessly by not attempting to
prevent them. 28 6 The court found that Thompson knew about the transaction and understood the basic capitalization needs and the type of investment involved in the transaction and, in his capacity as Vice Presi8 These
dent, could have reviewed documents relating to the offering.23
factors raised 8questions of material fact concerning Thompson's good
2
faith defense.
D. Fraud
In Leonard v. Stuart-James Co.,23 8 the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia examined several issues under the federal securities
laws. Plaintiff opened an investment account with Stuart-James and
signed an agreement that contained a provision providing for arbitration
of all claims between the parties, but did not prevent judicial review of
federal securities laws claims. At the time of the execution of this agreement, a rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission"
required the inclusion of such language in the agreement.24 0 The court
decided that the plain language of the agreement excepted federal securities laws claims from arbitration and did not provide for potential
231. 742 F. Supp. at 667-68 (citing G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958
(5th Cir. 1981)).
232. Id. at 668 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988)).
233. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988)).
234. Id. (quoting G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d at 958).
235, Id. at 669.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 742 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
239. Rule 15c2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1987).
240. 742 F. Supp. at 655.
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changes in such laws.2 The court refused to allow the rescission of the
rule to negate express terms in a contract and refused to stay the federal
claims pending arbitration of the other claims between the parties.242
Beginning in June 1987, plaintiff invested in certain "penny stocks"
recommended by Stuart-James but decided to sell the securities in October of 1987 because plaintiff felt that a Stuart-James salesman acted too
aggressively in dealing with his account. This salesman refused to sell the
securities, and the market value decreased. Stuart-James refused to refund the value of the securities as of the date plaintiff requested their
sale. Plaintiff alleged that the salesman's failure to sell and Stuart-James'
misrepresentations and omissions caused his losses. Plaintiff alleged that
Stuart-James acted as part of a conspiracy to manipulate the market and
the price of the securities." Plaintiff's allegations required the court to
determine an issue not addressed by any federal appellate court, whether
section 12(2) of the Securities Act' 4 4 applies to securities traded on the
secondary market. Certain district courts examining the issue decided
that the purpose of the Securities Act was to regulate initial distributions.2" Plaintiff contended that Stuart-James' position as a market
maker allowed it to offer the securities in batches and that section 12(2)
covers batch offerings. The court refused to find that plaintiff stated a
claim allowable under section 12(2).'"
The court next examined plaintiffs claim under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.24 Although plaintiff alleged that Stuart-James was guilty
of misrepresentation, plaintiff did not describe with specificity any misrepresentation. The court set forth the elements of an action under section 10(b) and rule 10(b)(5): (1) a false statement or omission of material
fact (2) made with scienter (3) justifiably relied upon by the plaintiff (4)
that proximately caused plaintiffs injury." The court went on to state
that one can prove scienter by showing either knowing misconduct or se241. Id. at 656-57. See, e.g., Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729 (3d
Cir. 1989). The United States Supreme Court has decided that claims under the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act are arbitrable. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) and Rodriquez de Quisas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
242. 742 F. Supp. at 657.
243. Id. Defendant alleged that Stuart-James failed to disclose the large spread between
bid and ask prices, dominated the market, manipulated the market, and engaged in other
misrepresentations and omissions. Id. at 657-58.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
245. 742 F. Supp. at 658 (citing Strong v. Paine Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. N.Y.
1988); Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 692 F. Supp. 1322 (S.D. Fla. 1988); SSH Co. v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. N.Y. 1987)).
246. 742 F. Supp. at 658.
247. Id. at 659.
248. Id. (citing Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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vere recklessness,' and that reliance can be satisfied by an allegation of
fraud on the market.2'0 The court also discussed the two elements of causation: (1) transaction causation, in which the misrepresentation is the
cause of the purchase of the securities; and (2) loss causation, in which
the misrepresentation is the proximate cause of the 1os.251 The court

found that plaintiff alleged facts that were subject to a claim under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5(a) or (c). 81' The court found sufficient facts present to support allegations of reliance, reckless disregard (rather than scienter), and transaction causation, and allowed plaintiff to amend in order
2
to cure the deficiency of failing to allege facts showing loss causation. 3
Additionally, the court decided that plaintiff could allege controlling person liability if he were able to assert a section 10(b) claim.2"

The court applied a two-year limitations period taken from the most
analogous state statute but determined that federal law governs the tolling of the statute of limitations. The decision in Lampf should alleviate
the confusion over different statutory periods applied by various federal
courts."'

E. Legislative Changes
During its 1991 session, the legislature authorized public entities have
issued bonds to invest the proceeds in insured deposits, securities, investment trusts, management-type investment companies, common trust
funds maintained by a bank or trust company or other interests in registered investment funds.25
V.

CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Georgia courts considered cases dealing
with piercing of the corporate veil, preincorporation acts, derivative actions, partnership liability for debts, the partnership relationship, partners' duty to inquire, the acquisition of branch banks, commercial unreasonableness, misapplication of funds, restructuring of loans, the definition
of a security, the sale of unregistered securities, rescission and controlling
personal liability, and securities fraud. The courts did not break new
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. (citing McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
Id. (citing Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Id. at 660.
Id.

254. Id.
255. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
256. SB 175.
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ground in the surveyed areas, and for the most part failed to give new
direction to practitioners and potential litigants.

